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Abstract In this study, we introduce and examine the Egalitarian property for some
power indices on the class of simple games. This property means that after intersecting
a game with a symmetric or anonymous game the difference between the values of
two comparable players does not increase. We prove that the Shapley–Shubik index,
the absolute Banzhaf index, and the Johnston score satisfy this property. We also give
counterexamples for Holler, Deegan–Packel, normalized Banzhaf and Johnston indi-
ces. We prove that the Egalitarian property is a stronger condition for efficient power
indices than the Lorentz domination.
1 Introduction
The main motivation of this study is to answer the following question: Does consensus
increase egalitarianism in social choice? To answer this question we will deal with the
analysis of power distribution for some power indices. For this purpose, we introduce
and study the Egalitarian property for power indices.
The question of fairness and equality in the distribution of power is an impor-
tant subject of interest, and it is a widely considered concept in the political, social,
J. Freixas
Department of Applied Mathematics III and High Engineering School of Manresa,
Technical University of Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain
e-mail: josep.freixas@upc.edu
D. Marciniak (B)
National Institute of Telecommunications, Ul. Szachowa 1, 04-894 Warsaw, Poland
e-mail: Dorota.address@gmail.com
D. Marciniak
Centre for Research and Studies in Sociology, CIES-ISCTE-IUL, Lisbon, Portugal
123
208 J. Freixas, D. Marciniak
and economical context (see for example Gambarelli and Owen 2002; Laruelle and
Valenciano 2002; Holler 2002; Turnovec 2002; Felsenthal and Machover 2001).
Typically in the legislative bodies, a quorum is necessary for legislation to be passed.
The procedure used to pass a law considered of great importance requires a strong
support, not just in the sense of majority but also about other issues. Often two voting
rules need to be satisfied (a double majority voting rule). For example, in the Euro-
pean Union, a double majority voting takes the form of Qualified Majority Voting.1
This voting rule is an example of the common decision making process, which can be
expressed in the form of “voting by count and account”. It is popular on the interna-
tional level (e.g., European Union) as well as in the local communities, and companies
(e.g., via the shareholders). This method represents a compromise between power and
equality. The equality is represented by a consensus rule.
We consider power indices from both sides, either as a measure of influence or as a
payoff, as described in Felsenthal and Machover (1998). Power indices are important
mathematical tools broadly used in Social Science, Political Science, and Economics.
The property we introduce might have applications in these domains, as it refers to
the notion of equalizing the power distribution.
The notion of egalitarian property introduced here is related to the notion of Lorentz
domination, which can be studied on the class of complete simple games. It was con-
sidered, for example, in Peleg (1992) and Weymark (1981). The notion of egalitarian
property can be considered on the class of all simple games, and therefore it can be
used in more situations.
In Peleg (1992), Peleg proved that Lorentz domination is satisfied for the
Shapley–Shubik index. In the last section of this study, we show that our result for
Shapley–Shubik index improves Peleg’s result. Indeed, egalitarian property in this
case implies Lorentz domination for an efficient power index which is, for example,
the Shapley–Shubik index. We also show that Lorentz domination does not imply the
egalitarian property for efficient power indices, which makes egalitarian property a
stronger condition in this sense.
The article is organized as follows. First, we give basic definitions and set nota-
tions in the preliminary part. Then, we prove the egalitarian property for the class
of semi-indices and for the Johnston score. In the next section, we study the relation
between the egalitarian property and Lorentz domination, and we show that for effi-
cient power indices the egalitarian property implies Lorentz domination. This is the
case of the Shapley–Shubik index, and therefore it makes the egalitarian property a
stronger condition than Lorentz domination. We show that other well-known power
indices do not satisfy this property by constructing examples. For the reader’s conve-
nience, the examples and all the proofs are included in an appendix at the end of the
article.
1 This voting system is to be applied to almost all policy areas starting in 2014 under the Treaty of Lisbon.
Any decision taken under this scheme will require the support of at least 55% of the members of the Council
of the European Union, who must also represent at least 65% of the EU’s citizens. More information on
voting systems in the EU can be found for example at http://europa.eu/.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present some background knowledge that will be used in further
considerations. We provide the definitions, notation, and terminology.
2.1 Simple games
Definition 1 Let N be the set of players. A simple game G is defined by a subset
Win(G) of the set of parts of N , denoted by P(N ). The set Win(G) is defined with
respect to the following property: if S ⊆ S′ ⊆ N and S ∈ Win(G) then S′ ∈ Win(G).
It is also required that ∅ /∈ Win(G) and N ∈ Win(G). Each subset S ⊆ N is referred to
as a coalition. The set N is called the grand coalition. The members of the set Win(G)
are called winning coalitions. A coalition which is not winning is called losing. The set
of losing coalitions will be denoted as Lo(G). The set of winning (losing) coalitions of
player i will be denoted by Wini (G)( Loi (G) ), i.e., Wini (G) = {S ∈ Win(G) : i ∈ S}
( Loi (G) = {S ∈ Lo(G) : i ∈ S} ).
The set of all simple games with n voters will be denoted by Sn .
An equivalent definition of simple game is given by a characteristic function. A
characteristic function of a simple game G is any function vG : P(N ) → {0, 1}
which satisfies the following conditions:
(a) vG is monotonic, i.e., it preserves the inclusion order of P(N ): if S ⊆ S′ ⊆ N
and v(S) = 1 then v(S′) = 1,
(b) vG(∅) = 0,
(c) vG(N ) = 1.
For any given simple game G it holds Win(G) = v−1G (1).
Definition 2 Let G be a simple game. Then a coalition S ∈ Win(G) is minimal
winning if none of its proper sub-coalitions is winning. The set of minimal winning
coalitions will be denoted by Winmin(G) or simply by Winmin.
A coalition of G is maximal losing if it is losing and all of its proper supra-coali-
tions are winning. The set of maximal losing coalitions will be denoted by Lomax(G)
or just Lomax.
Remark 1 The set of minimal winning coalitions determines the game uniquely. The
same applies to the set of maximal losing coalitions.
2.2 Voting by “count and account”
Definition 3 (Weighted Voting Game) Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players and
let us denote the set of associated non-negative real weights by {w1, w2, . . . , wn}. Let
q be a positive real quota. We can set a simple game by the following rule
S is winning ⇐⇒
∑
i∈S
wi ≥ q
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A simple game of this form is called weighted voting game and is denoted by
[q;w1, w2, . . . , wn]. Thereafter, we will use the convention w1 ≥ w2 ≥ · · · ≥ wn .
The form [q;w1, ..., wn] of a simple game is often called a weighted representation.
A simple game can have many weighted representations. If n > 3 there are simple
games that cannot be represented as a weighted voting game.
Two simple but important classes of weighted voting games are “voting by count”
and “voting by account” games. By “voting by count” we refer to the weighted simple
game in which a coalition is winning if it contains more than half of the players as a
“majority of the count rule”. By “voting by account” we refer to the weighted simple
game in which a coalition is winning if the sum of weights of its members exceeds half
of the sum of weights of all the players as the “majority of the account rule”. “Voting
by count and account” refers to the simple game in which a coalition is winning if it
is winning with respect to both rules.
Remark 2 Let us remark that the class of Voting by count and account games con-
tains all weighted voting games, but also other games which are complete games. The
definition of complete game is recalled in the following subsection.
2.3 Swings and desirability relation
Let us recall the meaning of swing in a coalition as well as the desirability relation.
Both notions play an important role in this article.
Definition 4 (Down-swing) Let G be a simple game. A player i has a down-swing
in a coalition S if S ∈ Wini (G) and S\{i} /∈ Win(G). We will denote it as i ↓ S. The
set of coalitions in which player i has a down-swing will be denoted by Sw↓i (G) or
simply by Sw↓i .
Definition 5 (Up-swing) Let G be a simple game. A player i has an up-swing in a
coalition S if S ∈ Lo(G) and S ∪ {i} ∈ Wini (G). We will denote it as i ↑ S. The set
of coalitions in which player i has up-swing will be denoted by Sw↑i (G) or simply by
Sw↑i .
The following is a well-known result.
Remark 3 The number of up-swings of a player i is equal to its number of down-
swings for any simple game.
In this study, we will use the term swing interchangeably with down-swing and we
will denote the set Sw↓i also as Swi . If a player i has a swing vote in a coalition S we
will use the terms i is decisive in S or S is a swing coalition of i .
Here, we present a short list of properties of players in simple games. A player
i ∈ N in a simple game G is:
(1) winner if {i} ∈ Win(G),
(2) veto player if i ∈ S for all S ∈ Win(G),
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(3) dictator if {i} is the unique minimal winning coalition,
(4) null player if i /∈ S for all S ∈ Winmin(G).
A player is a dictator if and only if it is a winner and has veto.
Definition 6 Let G be a simple game,
i D j iff S ∪ { j} ∈ Win j (G) ⇒ S ∪ {i} ∈ Wini (G) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}
It is not difficult to check that D is a preordering. It is called desirability (resp.,
strict desirability) relation and ∼D is the equi-desirability relation (Isbell 1958).
When the desirability relation in a game G should be distinguished from the desir-
ability relation of another game G ′ we will use the notation D[G].
Definition 7 A simple game is complete if the desirability relation is total, i.e., for
any two players i and j at least one of the following holds: i D j or j D i .
2.4 Power indices
Definition 8 A power index ψ is a map ψ : Sn → Rn+ that assigns to each simple
game v ∈ Sn a vector of Rn+, whose components represent the payoff or influence
measure of each voter. The components of this function will be denoted by ψi [v].
If we consider a normalized power index, we can replace Rn+ by [0, 1]n in the codomain
of ψ .
Let us recall briefly some well-known power indices for simple games. For refer-
ences on them see among others: Banzhaf (1965), Shapley and Shubik (1954), Johnston
(1978), Holler (1982), and Deegan and Packel (1978).
Shapley–Shubik index
Shi [G] = 1|N |!
∑
S∈Swi
(|S| − 1)! (|N | − |S|)! (1)
Banzhaf score
β#i [G] = |Swi (G)| (2)
Banzhaf normalized index
β˙i [G] = βi [G]∑
j∈N
β j [G] (3)
Banzhaf absolute index
βi [G] = β#[G]/2|N |−1 (4)
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The Banzhaf normalized index is also called the “relative Banzhaf index” to dis-
tinguish it from its other versions. Banzhaf index is also known as Penrose–Banzhaf–
Coleman index.
Johnston score
S #i [G] =
∑
S∈Swi
1
dS
(5)
where dS = ∑i∈S di (S) and di (S) = vG(S) − vG(S\{i}) is the marginal con-
tribution of player i into S. Then dS is equal to the number of decisive members
of S.
Johnston index
S˙i [G] = Si [G]∑
j∈N
S j [G] (6)
Holler index
χ˙i [G] = χ
#
i [G]∑
j∈N
χ j [G] (7)
where
χ#i [G] =
∣∣Winmini [G]
∣∣
We will refer to χ# as Holler score.
Deegan–Packel index
δ˙i [G] = 1∣∣Winmin∣∣
∑
S∈Winmini [G]
1
|S| (8)
We will refer to
∑
S∈Winmini [G]
1
|S| as Deegan–Packel score of player i in the game
G and we will denote it by δ#i [G].
Definition 9 A semi-index ψ , or semivalue for simple games, is a power index on the
class of simple games that satisfies:
(1) symmetry: for any simple game v, and for any bijection θ : N → N , it is
ψθ(i)[θv] = ψi [v],
where the simple game θv is defined by θv(S) = v(θ(S)) for any coalition S.
(2) positivity: ψ[v] ≥ 0, for all v ∈ Sn .
(3) dummy player property: if i is a dummy player in game v, i.e., v(S ∪ {i}) =
v(S) + v({i}) for all S ⊆ N\{i}, then ψi [v] = v({i}).
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(4) transfer property: for any two simple games u and v
ψ[u ∨ v] = ψ[u] + ψ[v] − ψ[u ∧ v].
where (u ∨ v)(S) = max{u(S), v(S)} and (u ∧ v)(S) = min{u(S), v(S)}.
The class of semi-indices is a broad and important class of power indices. A good
survey on semi-indices is Carreras et al. (2003). Let us recall that the Shapley–Shubik
index and the Banzhaf absolute index are semi-indices. In Freixas (2010), the ordinal
equivalence of these two semi-indices it is studied and several subclasses of semi-
indices are also considered: regular, binomial, or segment semi-indices. However, the
indices defined in: (2), (3), (5), (6), (7), and (8) are not semi-indices. In this article,
we deal with all the cases: the class of semi-indices and the remaining six indices just
mentioned above. In the next section, we define the egalitarian property and prove that
it is satisfied for the class of semi-indices and also for the Johnston score.
3 The egalitarian property for power indices
The property we introduce here is related to a power analysis in simple games with
different levels of consensus. One real-life example of two voting systems with two
different levels of consensus are the decision rules adopted in the Nice European
summit, held in December 2000, for the European Union enlargement voting system:
Example 1 In the European Union Council there are the following players (in this
context countries), which are listed with respect to populations:
[1] Germany, [2] United Kingdom, [3] France, [4] Italy, [5] Spain,
[6] Poland, [7] Romania, [8] The Netherlands, [9] Greece, [10] Czech
Republic, [11] Belgium, [12] Hungary, [13] Portugal, [14] Sweden,
[15] Bulgaria, [16] Austria, [17] Slovak Republic, [18] Denmark,
[19] Finland, [20] Ireland, [21] Lithuania, [22] Latvia, [23] Slovenia,
[24] Estonia, [25] Cyprus, [26] Luxembourg, [27] Malta.
and two rules of voting:
v1 ∩ v2 ∩ v3 v1 ∩ v′2 ∩ v3
where
v1 = [255; 29(4), 27(2), 14, 13, 12(5), 10(3), 7(5), 4(5), 3]
v2 = [14; 1(25)]
v′2 = [18; 1(25)]
v3 = [620; 170, 123, 122, 120, 82, 80, 47, 33, 22, 21(4),
18, 17(2), 11(3), 8(2), 5, 4, 3, 2, 1(2)]
The notation 29(4) in v1 means that the four biggest countries: 1-Germany, 2-Great
Britain, 3-France and 4-Italy have weight 29 in v1, and so on. For example, Poland
is the sixth most populated country and therefore has weight 27 in v1, weight 1 in v2
and in v′2, and weight 80 in v3.
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Comparing the two decision rules, we see that they can be represented as an intersec-
tion of a simple game G = v1 ∩ v3 and a symmetric game (v2 or v′2 ). In the first rule,
the quorum is 14, while in the second rule it is 18. In this section, we study how does
the voting power distribution change when we increase the quorum, i.e., the level of
consensus.
3.1 Level of consensus in a simple game
Let us establish some basic definitions and notations used in further considerations.
A symmetric game is a simple weighted voting game of the form [γ ; 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
].
It is denoted by Qγ and we will refer to γ as the quorum number (or consensus level)
for Qγ , or simply quorum.
In a symmetric game all the participants are equivalent by the desirability relation.
In the simple game Gγ = G ∩ Qγ two comparable participants that are not equi-desir-
able in G can be equalized by the desirability relation in Gγ . Therefore, we can expect
that in the game Gγ , which appears to be more egalitarian than G with regard to the
desirability relation, actors will be treated more equally. This accords with the intui-
tion as we pass from the generic simple game G to Gγ only requiring one additional
consensus condition.
Definition 10 We say that a simple game G2 has a higher level of consensus than G1
if these games can be represented as G1 = G ∩ Qγ1 and G2 = G ∩ Qγ2 with γ2 > γ1.
Note that it might be Gγ1 = Gγ2 even if λ2 > λ1. A very simple example of such
possibility is obtained by taking G as the symmetric game Qλ with λ ≥ λ2.
As remarked before, the desirability relation in Gγ can equalize players that were
not equivalent in G. However, the order obtained in Gγ is not contradictory to the
desirability relation of G, i.e., it never happens that i D[G] j and j D[Gγ ] i for
arbitrary players i and j .
Let us remark that if two players are comparable in u ∩ Qγ then they remain com-
parable in all games u ∩ Qγ ′ , γ ′ ≥ γ . Moreover, if i D[u∩Qγ ] j then i D[u∩Qγ ′ ] j
for all γ ′ ≥ γ and if i ∼D[u∩Qγ ] j then i ∼D[u∩Qγ ′ ] j for all γ ′ ≥ γ .
When two players in a game G are equalized in Gγ with respect to the desirability
relation then they become equally powerful. Consequently, we expect an arbitrary
power index to preassign the same value to both players. Evidently, for players that
are equivalent in Gγ the differences of evaluations given by the power index are not
increased when passing from G to Gγ . We shall require this behavior not only for
players being symmetric in Gγ but also for all players. This property of power indices
will be called the egalitarian property.
Definition 11 Let G be a simple game. Consider an egalitarian sequence of games:
(G ∩ Qγ )γ=1,2,...,n
where Qγ is a symmetric game at consensus level γ . We say that an index ψ has the
egalitarian property if for each simple game G and for any two comparable players
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i and j (i D j):
ψi [Gγ ] − ψ j [Gγ ] ≥ ψi [Gγ+1] − ψ j [Gγ+1] (9)
where ψi [Gγ ] is the value of player i for index ψ in game Gγ = G ∩ Qγ .
If a power index satisfies the egalitarian property, then the index is more scattered
in a game with a prefixed consensus than in a game with a higher level of consensus.
For example, if the power index is considered as a payoff distribution, the egalitarian
property means that the higher the level of consensus the smaller the difference of
payoffs of any pair of voters.
3.2 Egalitarian property for the class of semi-indices
Theorem 1 Every semi-index satisfies the egalitarian property.
Corollary 1 The Banzhaf absolute index and the Shapley–Shubik index satisfy the
egalitarian property.
Remark 4 All regular semi-indices (semi-indices with positive coefficients) preserve
the desirability relation, see Carreras and Freixas (2008), but the non-regular semi-indi-
ces do not necessarily preserve it. However, all semi-indices do satisfy the egalitarian
property because the order given by the desirability relation never reverses the order
given by semi-indices.
3.3 The Egalitarian property for the Johnston score
Theorem 2 The Johnston score J satisfies the egalitarian property.
3.4 Indices that do not satisfy the egalitarian property
It is important to remark that if a power index preserves the desirability relation it does
not imply that the power index satisfies the egalitarian property. The following result
provides remarkable examples of indices that fit in this category:
Remark 5 The normalized versions of the Banzhaf and Johnston indices do not satisfy
the egalitarian property.
Other known power indices not preserving the desirability relation also do not
satisfy the egalitarian property.
Remark 6 The both versions, the raw (the score) and the normalized, of the Holler
and the Deegan–Packel indices do not satisfy the egalitarian property.
As a corollary of this remark, the egalitarian property is not satisfied by other
indices. For example, the Shift-power index (see Alonso-Meijide and Freixas 2010),
which also does not preserve the desirability relation, does not satisfy the egalitarian
property.
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4 Egalitarian property and Lorentz domination
In this section, we show that our result concerning the Shapley–Shubik index improves
the result of Peleg (1992, Theorem 3.1) (see also Weymark 1981) on Lorentz dom-
ination for complete simple games. Peleg’s result states that for a complete simple
game u and games v1 = u ∩ Qγ1 and v2 = u ∩ Qγ2 with 0 ≤ γ1 < γ2 ≤ 1, Sh(v2)
Lorentz–dominates Sh(v1), i.e.,
n∑
i= j
Shi [v2] ≥
n∑
i= j
Shi [v1] for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Thereafter, we use the convention that the players are enumerated with decreas-
ing desirability order, i.e., 1 D[u] 2 D[u] · · · D[u] n for all u ∈ Sn . In that situa-
tion Carreras and Freixas (2004) note that Peleg’s result also holds for simple games
u as long as v1 becomes a complete simple game. From efficiency and the Lorentz–
domination of the Shapley–Shubik index we get:
(i) Sh1[v1] ≥ Sh1[v2] and
(ii) Shn[v1] ≥ Shn[v2].
This result reflects the egalitarianism of the Shapley–Shubik index (see Carreras and
Freixas 2004) in the sense that:
Sh1[v1] − Shn[v1] ≥ Sh1[v2] − Shn[v2] (10)
Our result concerning egalitarian property for the Shapley–Shubik index (Theorem 1)
improves Peleg’s result in at least two aspects:
(1) We consider the class of all simple games (not only the class of complete simple
games), as we investigate pairs of players comparable by the desirability relation.
Theorem 1 can be applied to non-comparable players i and j in a simple game u,
provided that they become comparable in u ∩ Qγ for some γ . Thus, Theorem 1
can be applied to compare two individual players in a non-complete game, when the
assumptions of Peleg’s theorem do not hold.
(2) Equation 10 does not only hold for the extreme players (the strongest and the
weakest) but for any pair of comparable players.
Theorem 1 does not follow from the Lorentz domination even if we additionally assume
efficiency. As an example see counterexample 4, where the Lorentz domination holds
for Banzhaf and Johnston indices, but not the egalitarian property. However,
(3) Egalitarian property and efficiency imply Lorentz domination, as we will prove
in Theorem 3.
Thus, our Theorem 3 is an independent and stronger result.
Theorem 3 Egalitarian property and efficiency of a power index, which preserves the
desirability order imply its Lorentz domination in the class of complete simple games.
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Therefore, even in the class of complete simple games for an efficient index ψ
which respects the desirability order we have the following:
Egalitarian property ⇒ Lorentz domination
5 Conclusions
The results shown in this article give an explicit answer to the question of equalizing
the power distribution by adding a quorum condition to the game. We can deduce
that not all the known power indices reflect in required way egalitarianism among the
players.
Among the considered indices only the Shapley–Shubik index satisfies the egalitar-
ian property being efficient at the same time. This can be regarded as a counter-intuitive
behavior of the rest of considered indices. We conclude that it is better to use non nor-
malized versions of Banzhaf and Johnston indices if are interested in decreasing the
differences of values between pairs of players. The results obtained here can have
some impact in topics like economic distance or social inequalities.
An important application of the results of this article can refer to a common vot-
ing system: voting by count and account. It is a double majority rule composed of
the simple majority rule (voting by count) and the weighted majority rule (voting by
account). This decision making system has a long tradition and it is presently used in
many electoral systems. Examples can be found, for instance, in Taylor and Zwicker
(1999, p. 19), Taylor (1995), and Hirokawa and Xu (2005). It is of the interest to study
this voting system as it appears in many real-life examples.
In Peleg (1992), it is proved that voting by count and account is more egalitarian for
the Shapley–Shubik index than voting by account. This result answers the question,
for the case of Shapley–Shubik index, raised by Thomson in a letter to Aumann: to
find a relationship between game theoretic solutions of voting by account versus by
count and account. However, he left opened the question for other solutions.
In a recent article, Hirokawa and Vlach (2006), the authors address a similar ques-
tion for the case of Banzhaf, Johnston, and Deegan–Packel scores. They show that
an analogous shift of power occurs when the power distribution is measured by the
Banzhaf and Johnston scores. On the other hand, they show that this is not true for the
case of Deegan–Packel score. These results refer to the comparison of power distribu-
tions in voting by account and in voting by count and account. It is known that while
both rules: the “count rule” and the “account rule” can be represented by weighted
simple games their intersection does not necessarily admit a weighted representation
(see Peleg 1992). However, the intersection of two weighted voting games is always a
complete game (Definition 7) whenever their desirability orders are not contradictory,
which is satisfied for the count and account rule. In this context, a subclass of com-
plete games is the broadest class to study the question of increasing egalitarianism in
a “count and account” decision making process.
In this article, we answer a more general question. We show that when replacing
an “account” rule by a more general complete game we get a more egalitarian power
distribution for the Shapley–Shubik index and Banzhaf and Johnston scores. We prove
this also for the class of all semi-indices. These results generalize the results in Peleg
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(1992) and Hirokawa and Vlach (2006), in two directions: for a larger class of power
indices, and for a larger class of games.
A further study to be done would be to study other power indices with respect to
the egalitarian property, for example, other indices presented in the Voting Power and
Power Index Website, http://powerslave.val.utu.fi/. Some results can yet be derived
from the results of this study, as corollaries, for example, that the Coleman Collectiv-
ity Index (Coleman 1971), the Coleman Preventive Power Index (Coleman 1971), and
Rae Index (Rae 1969) also satisfy the egalitarian property.
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Appendices
A Proof of Theorem 1
Every semi-index can be expressed as ψi [G] = ∑nk=1 αkβki [G], where βki is defined
βki [G] =
∣∣{S ∈ Swi (G) : |S| = k
}∣∣
and αk ∈ R+ (αk > 0). Let us remark that αk does not depend on the game G, and
we have βki [Gγ ] = 0 for k < γ . Thus, the sum can be represented as
ψi [Gγ ] = αγ βγi [Gγ ] + αγ+1βγ+1i [Gγ ] +
∑
k≥γ+2
αkβki [Gγ ]
Then the inequality (9) takes the form:
(
αγ β
γ
i [Gγ ] + αγ+1βγ+1i [Gγ ] +
∑
k≥γ+2
αkβki [Gγ ]
)
−
(
αγ β
γ
j [Gγ ] + αγ+1βγ+1j [Gγ ] +
∑
k≥γ+2
αkβkj [Gγ ]
)
≥
(
αγ+1βγ+1i [Gγ+1] +
∑
k≥γ+2
αkβki [Gγ+1]
)
−
(
αγ+1βγ+1j [Gγ+1] +
∑
k≥γ+2
αkβkj [Gγ+1]
)
Every semi-index has the property that for k > γ + 1
αk · βki [Gγ ] = αk · βki [Gγ+1]
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and so it is enough to prove that when we increase the quorum from γ to γ + 1 then
αγ β
γ
i [Gγ ] − αγ βγj [Gγ ] ≥ αγ βγi [Gγ+1] − αγ βγj [Gγ+1], (11)
αγ+1βγ+1i [Gγ ] − αγ+1βγ+1j [Gγ ] ≥ αγ+1βγ+1i [Gγ+1] − αγ+1βγ+1j [Gγ+1].
(12)
Note that the right hand side of the Eq. 11 is equal to 0, because both components on
the right hand side are 0.
To show the inequalities (11) and (12), since αγ and αγ+1 are non-negative real
numbers, it is enough to prove the following inequalities:
β
γ
i [Gγ ] − βγj [Gγ ] ≥ 0, (13)
β
γ+1
i [Gγ ] − βγ+1j [Gγ ] ≥ βγ+1i [Gγ+1] − βγ+1j [Gγ+1]. (14)
Note that (13) holds since i D[G] j . It is so for k = γ , because βγi [Gγ ] ≥ βγj [Gγ ]
and βγi [Gγ+1] = 0 = βγj [Gγ+1] as there is no winning coalition of cardinality γ in
the game Gγ+1. Let us now prove the Eq. 14 for k = γ + 1. We will consider the
following sets:
S+i, j =
{
S ⊆ N : |S| = γ + 1, i, j ∈ S}
S−i, j =
{
S ⊆ N : |S| = γ, i, j /∈ S}
and let us consider the sets of up-swings Sw↑i in S
−
i, j and down-swings Sw
↓
i in S
+
i, j .
Let us recall the definition of the sets of up-swings and down-swings:
Sw↑i =
{
S ⊆ N : i /∈ S, S /∈ Win(G), S ∪ {i} ∈ Win(G)
}
Sw↓i =
{
S ∈ Wini (G) : S\{i} /∈ Wini (G)
}
In the case of S+i, j we have the following partition of this set:
S+1 =
{
S ∈ Lo(G) : |S| = γ + 1, i, j ∈ S
}
= Lo(G) ∩ S+i, j
S+2 =
{
S ∈ Sw↓j (G) : |S| = γ + 1, i, j ∈ S
}
= Sw↓j ∩ S+i, j
S+3 =
{
S ∈ Sw↓i (G)\Sw↓j (G) : |S|=γ + 1, i, j ∈ S
}
=
(
Sw↓i (G)\Sw↓j (G)
)
∩S+i, j
S+4 =
{
S ∈ Win(G)\Sw↓i : |S| = γ + 1, i, j ∈ S
}
=
(
Win(G)\Sw↓i
)
∩ S+i, j
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and we have the partition of S−i, j :
S−1 =
{
S ∈ Lo(G)\Sw↑i : |S| = γ, i, j /∈ S
}
=
(
Lo(G)\Sw↑i
)
∩ S−i, j
S−2 =
{
S ∈ Sw↑i \Sw↑j (G) : |S| = γ, i, j /∈ S
}
=
(
Sw↑i \Sw↑j
)
∩ S−i, j
S−3 =
{
S ∈ Sw↑j (G) : |S| = γ, i, j /∈ S
}
= Sw↑j (G) ∩ S−i, j
S−4 =
{
S ∈ Win(G) : |S| = γ, i, j /∈ S
}
= Win(G) ∩ S−i, j
Then in the games Gγ and Gγ+1:
β
γ+1
i [Gγ ] = |S+2 | + |S+3 | + |S−2 | + |S−3 |
β
γ+1
j [Gγ ] = |S+2 | + |S−3 |
β
γ+1
i [Gγ+1] = |S+2 | + |S+3 | + |S−2 | + |S−3 | + |S+4 | + |S−4 |
= βγ+1i [Gγ ] + |S+4 | + |S−4 |
β
γ+1
j [Gγ+1] = |S+2 | + |S−3 | + |S+3 | + AS+4 | + |S−4 |
= βγ+1j [Gγ ] + |S+3 | + |S+4 | + |S−4 |
Then we get the inequality (14) by putting the above formulas into (14) and doing
straightforward calculations (|S+3 | ≥ 0). When |S+3 | > 0 then we get strict inequality
in (14) and thus in (9), also if βγi [Gγ ] > βγj [Gγ ] then we get strict inequality in (9).
B Proof of Theorem 2
The Johnston index can be expressed as Ji [G] = ∑nk=1 J ki [G], where we define
J ki [G] =
∑
S∈Swi :|S|=k 1/dS , where dS is the number of decisive players in the coa-
lition S. We calculate dS only for coalitions that have at least one decisive player thus
1
dS is well defined. Moreover, J
k
i [Gγ ] = 0 for k < γ thus the above sum can be
represented as
Ji [Gγ ] = J γi [Gγ ] + J γ+1i [Gγ ] +
∑
k≥γ+2
J ki [Gγ ]
Then the inequality (9), which we are going to prove, takes the form:
(
J
γ
i [Gγ ] + J γ+1i [Gγ ] +
∑
k≥γ+2
J ki [Gγ ]
)
−
(
J
γ
j [Gγ ] + J γ+1j [Gγ ] +
∑
k≥γ+2
J kj [Gγ ]
)
≤
(
J
γ+1
i [Gγ+1] +
∑
k≥γ+2
J ki [Gγ+1]
)
−
(
J
γ+1
j [Gγ+1] +
∑
k≥γ+2
J kj [Gγ+1]
)
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The Johnston index has the property that for k > γ J ki [Gγ ] = J ki [Gγ+1] thus it is
enough to show that when we increase the quorum from γ to γ + 1 then
J ki [Gγ ] − J kj [Gγ ] ≥ J ki [Gγ+1] − J kj [Gγ+1], fork = γ, γ + 1. (15)
It is so for k = γ , because J γi [Gγ ] ≥ J γj [Gγ ] and J γi [Gγ+1] = 0 = J γj [Gγ+1]
as there is no winning coalition of cardinality γ in game Gγ+1. Let us now prove the
Eq. 15 for k = γ + 1. As in the proof of egalitarian property for Banzhaf score we
will consider the following sets:
S+i, j (k) =
{
S ⊆ N : |S| = k + 1, i, j ∈ S}
S−i, j (k) =
{
S ⊆ N : |S| = k, i, j /∈ S}
Let us consider the sets of up-swings Sw↑i in S
−
i, j (k) and down-swings Sw
↓
i in S
+
i, j (k).
Let us recall the definition of the sets of up-swings and down-swings:
Sw↑i =
{
S ⊆ N : i /∈ S, S /∈ Win(G), S ∪ {i} ∈ Win(G)
}
Sw↓i =
{
S ∈ Wini (G) : S\{i} /∈ Wini (G)
}
In the case of S+i, j (k) we have the following partition of this set:
S↓1 [G, i, j] =
{
S ∈ Lo(G) : |S| = γ + 1, i, j ∈ S
}
= Lo(G) ∩ S+i, j (γ )
S↓2 [G, i, j] =
{
S ∈ Sw↓j (G) : |S| = γ + 1, i, j ∈ S
}
= Sw↓j ∩ S+i, j (γ )
S↓3 [G, i, j] =
{
S ∈ Sw↓i (G)\Sw↓j (G) : |S| = γ + 1, i, j ∈ S
}
=
(
Sw↓i (G)\Sw↓j (G)
)
∩ S+i, j (γ )
S↓4 [G, i, j] =
{
S ∈ Win(G)\Sw↓i : |S| = γ + 1, i, j ∈ S
}
=
(
Win(G)\Sw↓i
)
∩ S+i, j (γ )
and we have the partition of S−i, j (γ − 1):
S↑1 [G, i, j] =
{
S ∈ Lo(G)\Sw↑i : |S| = γ, i, j /∈ S
}
=
(
Lo(G)\Sw↑i
)
∩ S−i, j (γ − 1)
S↑2 [G, i, j] =
{
S ∈ Sw↑i \Sw↑j (G) : |S| = γ, i, j /∈ S
}
=
(
Sw↑i \Sw↑j
)
∩ S−i, j (γ − 1)
S↑3 [G, i, j] =
{
S ∈ Sw↑j (G) : |S| = γ, i, j /∈ S
}
= Sw↑j (G) ∩ S−i, j (γ − 1)
S↑4 [G, i, j] =
{
S ∈ Win(G) : |S| = γ, i, j /∈ S
}
= Win(G) ∩ S−i, j (γ − 1)
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J
γ+1
i [G] = J γ+1i [Gγ ] =
∑
S∈S+i, j (k)∩Sw↓i
1
dS
+
∑
S∈S−i, j (k)∩Sw↑i
1
dS∪{i}
then we can decompose the sum in respect of the given partition of S+i, j (k) and S
−
i, j (k):
J
γ+1
i [G] = J γ+1i [Gγ ] =
∑
S∈S↓1 [G,i, j]∩Sw↓i
1
dS
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0
+
∑
S∈S↓2 [G,i, j]∩Sw↓i
1
dS
+
∑
S∈S↓3 [G,i, j]∩Sw↓i
1
dS
+
∑
S∈S↓4 [G,i, j]∩Sw↓i
1
dS
+
∑
S∈S↑1 [G,i, j]∩Sw↑i
1
dS∪{i}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0
+
∑
S∈S↑2 [G,i, j]∩Sw↑i
1
dS∪{i}
+
∑
S∈S↑3 [G,i, j]∩Sw↑i
1
dS∪{i}
+
∑
S∈S↑4 [G,i, j]∩Sw↑i
1
dS∪{i}
In the game G for the player i :
S↓1 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↓i = ∅ S↑1 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↑i = ∅
S↓2 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↓i = S↓2 [G, i, j] S↑2 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↑i = S↑2 [G, i, j]
S↓3 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↓i = S↓3 [G, i, j] S↑3 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↑i = S↑3 [G, i, j]
S↓4 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↓i = ∅ S↑4 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↑i = ∅
And for the player j :
S↓1 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↓j = ∅ S↑1 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↑j = ∅
S↓2 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↓j = S↓2 [G, i, j] S↑2 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↑j = ∅
S↓3 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↓j = ∅ S↑3 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↑j = S↑3 [G, i, j]
S↓4 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↓j = ∅ S↑4 [G, i, j] ∩ Sw↑j = ∅
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Then in the games G and Gγ we get:
J
γ+1
i [G] = J γ+1i [Gγ ] =
∑
S∈S↓2 [G,i, j]
1
dS
+
∑
S∈S↓3 [G,i, j]
1
dS
+
∑
S∈S↑2 [G,i, j]
1
dS∪{i}
+
∑
S∈S↑3 [G,i, j]
1
dS∪{i}
J
γ+1
j [G] = J γ+1j [Gγ ] =
∑
S∈S↓2 [G,i, j]
1
dS
+
∑
S∈S↑3 [G,i, j]
1
dS∪{ j}
thus their difference is:
J
γ+1
i [G] − J γ+1j [G] =
∑
S∈S↑2 [G,i, j]
1
dS∪{ j}
+
∑
S∈S↓3 [G,i, j]
1
dS
+
∑
S∈S↑3 [G,i, j]
1
dS∪{i}
−
∑
S∈S↑3 [G,i, j]
1
dS∪{ j}
≥
(
|S↑2 [G, i, j]| + |S↓3 [G, i, j]|
) 1
γ + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:A
(16)
and in the game Gγ+1:
J
γ+1
i [Gγ+1]
=
∑
S∈S↓2 [G,i, j]
1
dS [Gγ+1] +
∑
S∈S↓3 [G,i, j]
1
dS [Gγ+1]
+ ∑
S∈S↑2 [G,i, j]
1
dS∪{i}[Gγ+1] +
∑
S∈S↑3 [G,i, j]
1
dS∪{i}[Gγ+1]
+ ∑
S∈S↑4 [G,i, j]
1
dS∪{i}[Gγ+1] +
∑
S∈S↓4 [G,i, j]
1
dS[Gγ+1]
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
≤J γ+1i [Gγ ]
=
(
|S↓2 [G, i, j]| + |S↓3 [G, i, j]| + |S↑2 [G, i, j]| + |S↑3 [G, i, j]|
+|S↑4 [G, i, j]| + |S↓4 [G, i, j]|
) 1
γ + 1
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J
γ+1
j [Gγ+1] =
∑
S∈S↓2 [G,i, j]
1
dS[Gγ+1] +
∑
S∈S↑3 [G,i, j]
1
dS∪{ j}[Gγ+1]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤J γ+1j [Gγ ]
+
∑
S∈S↓3 [G,i, j]
1
dS[Gγ+1] +
∑
S∈S↑4 [G,i, j]
1
dS∪{ j}[Gγ+1] +
∑
S∈S↓4 [G,i, j]
1
dS[Gγ+1]
=
(
|S↓2 [G, i, j]| + |S↑3 [G, i, j]| + |S↓3 [G, i, j]| + |S↑4 [G, i, j]| + |S↓4 [G, i, j]|
)
× 1
γ + 1
thus the difference is:
J
γ+1
i [Gγ+1] − J γ+1j [Gγ+1] = |S↑2 [G, i, j]|
1
γ + 1 ≤ A
where A was defined in formula (16). What ends the proof.
C Proof of Remark 5
Counter Example 4 Let G = [8; 3, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1]. The player with weight 3 will be
denoted as 1, players with weight 2 as 21, 22 and players with weight 1 as 31, 32, 33.
The Banzhaf score and (normalized) index are as follows:
Banzhaf score Banzhaf index
game\player: 1 21 31 1 21 31
G 9 7 3 0.28 0.22 0.09
G ∩ Q5 6 4 4 0.23 0.15 0.15
and the Johnston score and index:
Johnston score Johnston index
game\player: 1 21 31 1 21 31
G 5 4 3 0.23 0.18 0.13
G ∩ Q5 5 4 4 0.25 0.16 0.16
It is important to observe that the difference of the Banzhaf index between players 1
and 21 are growing when we pass from G to G ∩ Q5: from 232  0.06 to 226  0.08.
Similarly for the Johnston index: the difference in G is 0.05 and in G ∩ Q5 it is equal
to 0.09.
D Proof of Remark 6
Holler and Deegan–Packel indices in contrast with the previously considered indices
do not respect the desirability order. Let us consider the orders given by values of
Holler index (χ ) or Deegan–Packel index (δ). We will denote these orders by χ and
δ respectively, i.e., i χ j in a game G if and only if χi [G] ≥ χ j [G] and similarly
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for δ . In the example below, we show that the orders can be contradictory when we
consider the set of orders coming from an egalitarian sequence of games, i.e., it can
happen that i >χ j in G ∩ Qγ1 and i <χ j in G ∩ Qγ2 for γ1 < γ2.
Counter Example 5 Let us consider a weighted simple game: G = [5; 5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0]. Player 1 is the one with weight 5, players with weight 1 will be denoted
as 21, 22, · · · , 210 and player 3 is the null player. The Deegan–Packel score and the
Deegan–Packel index in G and G5 are respectively equal to:
Deegan–Packel score Deegan–Packel index
game\player: 1 21 3 1 21 3
G 1 25.2 0 0.004 0.1 0
G ∩ Q5 66 49.2 24 0.11 0.08 0.04
and the Holler score and the Holler index are respectively:
Holler score Holler index
game\player: 1 21 3 1 21 3
G 1 1.26 0 0.001 0.01 0
G ∩ Q5 330 246 120 0.11 0.085 24
We can observe that when passing from G to G ∩ Q5 the power of a stronger player
is growing more than the power of a smaller player for the four evaluations, so that
all these four indices from the above tables do not satisfy the egalitarian property.
In the above examples both indices: Holler and Deegan–Packel give more value to
a weaker player than to a stronger player with respect to the desirability relation in the
game G but in the game G ∩ Q5, after intersecting it with the symmetric game with
consensus level 5, the stronger player gains more power according to these indices and
the orders χ and δ are now reversed. Egalitarian property for an index means that
weaker players with respect to the desirability relation gain more value after adding a
stronger quorum condition, which is not the case of these indices.
E Proof of Theorem 3
Let ψ be an efficient power index on Sn fulfilling the egalitarian property and respect-
ing the desirability relation, i.e., ψ1 ≥ ψ2 ≥ · · · ≥ ψn for any simple game v ∈ Sn .
For complete simple games, egalitarian property implies in particular the following:
ψ1[v1] − ψn[v1] ≥ ψ1[v2] − ψn[v2]
where v1 = u ∩ Qγ1 , v2 = u ∩ Qγ2 , 1 ≤ γ1 < γ2 ≤ n, and u is a complete simple
game (or a simple game such that v1 is complete). Then efficiency of ψ implies that∑
i∈N ψi [v1] =
∑
i∈N ψi [v2] = 1.
First, we will show that ψn[v2] ≥ ψn[v1] and ψ1[v2] ≤ ψ1[v1]. Ad absurdum:
let us assume that 
 = ψn[v1] − ψn[v2] > 0. Then by the egalitarian property
ψi [v1]−ψn[v1] ≥ ψi [v2]−ψn[v2] if and only if ψi [v1]−ψi [v2] ≥ ψn[v1]−ψn[v2] =
123
226 J. Freixas, D. Marciniak

 > 0 and taking the sum for all players:
∑
i∈N
ψi [v1] −
∑
i∈N
ψi [v2] ≥ n
 > 0
a contradiction with the efficiency of ψ .
A similar argument shows that the value of the strongest player must decrease when
passing from v1 to v2.
Both functions: N  i → ψi [vk], k = 1, 2 are monotonic and ψ is egalitarian thus
the above property implies that there exists player i0 such that ψi [v2] > ψi [v1] for
i > i0 and ψi [v2] ≤ ψi [v1] for i ≤ i0. If such i0 does not exist then the egalitarian
property of ψ would not hold.
For k ≥ i0 we have ∑i≥k ψi [v2] ≥
∑
i≥k ψi [v1]. It remains to consider the case
k < i0. Then
∑
i≤k
ψi [v2] −
∑
i≤k
ψi [v1] =
( ∑
i0≤i≤k
ψi [v2] −
∑
i0≤i≤k
ψi [v1]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
)
+
( ∑
i<i0
ψi [v2] −
∑
i<i0
ψi [v1]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
)
≥
( ∑
i0≤i
ψi [v2] −
∑
i0≤i
ψi [v1]
)
+
( ∑
i<i0
ψi [v2] −
∑
i<i0
ψi [v1]
)
= 0
The last equality follows from efficiency of ψ , thus the left-hand side of the above
equation is greater than or equal to 0 and so the theorem holds.
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